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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in the demanding state at the time of the crime or that he is not a
fugitive, he will be released from custody.60 The accused may prove
mistaken identity.61 The Uniform Law gives the accused the right
to appear before a court and apply for a writ of habeas corpus if he
demands it.62 This is a departure from the general rule which makes
it a prerequisite to extradition that the accused be heard on a writ of
habeas corpus unless specifically waived in writing.63
With the exception of the provision which changes the law as
to fugitives and the few exceptions pointed out above 64 the Uniform
Extradition Act corresponds substantially with the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure.65
THOMAS BRESS.
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN SLUM-CLEARANCE AND
Low-COST HOUSING PROJECTS.
Origin of the Problem.
Under the authority of Title II of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, enacted by Congress in 1933,1 the President issued execu-
tive orders creating the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works and delegated to its Administrator all powers granted there-
under.2 "With a view to increasing employment quickly," 3 the Pub-
' State v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 53 Sup. Ct. 667 (1933) (burden of proving
absence should be beyond reasonable doubt) ; People ex rel. Sherman v. Barr,
131 Misc. 915, 229 N. Y. Supp. 268 (1928); (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 135;
Lawrence v. King, 203 Ind. 252, 180 N. E. 1 (1932); Roger v. Murnane, 172
Minn. 401, 215 N. W. 863 (1927) (burden of disproving flight on prisofier) ;
State ex rel. Gaines v. Westhues, 318 Mo. 928, 2 S. W. (2d) 612 (1928) ; In re
Hubbard, 201 N. C. 472, 160 S. E. 569 (1931) (warrant does not preclude
defendant from proving no flight)
Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 10. See Lee Gim Bor v. Ferrari, -55 F. (2d)
86, 84 A. L. R. 329 (1932) and note (John Doe indictment. Unless a demand
describes the person demanded so that he may be identified, no warrant of
arrest can properly issue) ; Ex parte Jowell, 87 Tex. Cr. 556, 223 S. W. 456
(1925) (evidence as to identity always admissible).
I Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 10. Cases, supra note 57.
IN. Y. CODE CRaI. PROC. § 827.
6 Notes 21, 63, supra. Proposed Unif. Extra. Act § 25 provides that a
person brought into this state on extradition is privileged from personal service
in civil actions, arising from the same facts as the crime for which he is being
returned, until he has been convicted in the criminal proceeding or if acquitted,
until he has had ample opportunity to return to the state from which he was
extradited." This modifies the New York law which permits personal service
for any cause and at any time. Netograph v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N.
E. 962 (1910). See A. B. C. of Extradition, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 16, 1934, at 1274.
REPORT OF LAW REVISION COMMIssION (1935) 153.
'48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701 (1934); 48 STAT. 200, 201
(1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §§ 401, 402, 403 (1934).
'Executive Order No. 6252, 40 U. S. C. A. § 414 (1934).
'48 STAT. 203 (a) (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §403 (1934).
[ VOL. 10
NOTES AND COMMENT
lic Works Administration was expressly granted the power "to ac-
quire * * * by exercise of the power of eminent domain, any real
or personal property" 4 in furtherance of the "construction, recon-
struction, alteration, or repair under public regulation or control of
low-cost housing and slum-clearance projects." r Pursuant to such
authority, the P. W. A. has embarked upon a comprehensive slum-
clearance and low-cost housing program that is nation-wide in" scope.6
The Federal Aspect.
In the case of United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louis-
ville, et al.,7 the constitutionality of the program was seriously chal-
lenged. There, the P. W. A. caused the United States Attorney to
file a petition in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky to condemn certain lands, preparatory to ac-
quiring a site for its Louisville project. The owners of the lands
sought to be condemned demurred, and an order sustaining the de-
murrer was entered together with a judgment denying the petition.
The decision, written by Judge Dawson, was predicated on the fol-
lowing grounds:
(1) The power of eminent domain is inherent in sovereignty
and is, therefore, possessed by the national government.
Furthermore, the Fifth Amendment, prohibiting the tak-
ing of private property for public use without just com-
pensation, implies that the national government has the
power of eminent domain.8
'Id. 203 (a) (3), 40 U. S. C. A. §403 (1934).
51d. 202 (d), 40 U. S. C. A. §402 (1934).
"The housing division of the P. W. A. has on its program ninety active
projects in seventy-five cities, which will provide some 45,000 dwelling units.
Modem accommodations of limited-dividend housing projects financed by the
P. W. A. are already being used by 11,000 persons. Approximately $290,000,000
have been appropriated by Congress for this work. Two blocks in Louisville
and $1,618,000 were involved in the Louisville case, infra note 7. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1936, at 2.
The Federal Housing Administration in its report to Congress stated that
its work had stimulated public interest "to a point where more than $1,000,000,000
of modernization has resulted through other means of finance." The report
showed that insurance had been given on modernization loans totaling$254,070,729, that $27,030,234 of mortgages on large-scale housing projects had
been insured, and that $257,561,769 worth of home mortgages "have been
selected for appraisal. * * * The long-term amortized mortgage has gained
nation-wide acceptance at uniform lower interest rates * * *. N. Y. Times,
Feb. 14, 1936, at 1.
The Rural Resettlement Administration, which controls approved projects,
involving resettlement of destitute or low-income families from rural or urban
areas, reported to Congress than in its first year of operation it had transacted
$540,080,202 worth of business. Ibid.
178 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935), aff'g 9 F. Supp. 137 (W. D. Ky.
1935). Appeal dismissed, N. Y. Times, March 6, 1936, at 4.
89 F. Supp. 137, 138 (W. D. Ky. 1935).
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(2) This power may be exercised to condemn private prop-
erty only for a public use, which means a use by the
government for legitimate governmental purposes, or a
use designed for all the public, even though available to
only a part of the public, whether the property is held by
the government or by some private agency.9
(3) This public right to use must result from the law itself.
In other words, a national emergency may afford a rea-
son for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but
the power must exist independently of the emergency3 °
(4) Therefore, the N. I. R. A., in so far as it attempts to
authorize the government to condemn private property
for slum-clearance and low-cost housing projects, is un-
constitutional. Such uses are not public uses."
(5) Article I, Section 8, clause 1, of the Constitution, em-
powering Congress to lay and collect taxes to pay debts
and provide for the general welfare, does not authorize
the condemnation. "This clause, by its very terms, re-
stricts Congress to providing for the general welfare
through appropriations only, because it relates only to
taxation and to the use of funds raised by taxation. It
does not authorize the exercise by Congress of a power
not committed to it merely that there may be brought
into existence something for which appropriations may be
made in the furtherance of general welfare. The power
granted is that of laying taxes-not that of providing for
the general welfare. The latter is only one of the- pur-
poses for which taxes may be levied." 12
(6) The power to condemn property proved to be a menace
to public health or safety is not the power of eminent
domain, but a part of the local police power, and may not
be exercised by the government within a state.13
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the government as
petitioner contended that it had the power to take land for the pur-
poses enumerated under Title II of the N. I. R. A.1 4 because (1)
Title II is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to appropriate
money under the general welfare clause; (2) condemnation for slum
clearance and low-cost housing is for a public use within the Fifth
Amendment; and (3) Congress, having declared the existence of the
'Ibid. et seq.
"Ibid.
,Id. at 141.
12 Id. at 142.
13 Ibid.
" Supra note 1.
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necessity to proceed with projects of the character here involved as a
means of providing for the public welfare, the courts may not over-
ride the legislative determination if Title II bears any reasonable
relation to the object intended. The appellee argued that (1) the
federal government has not the constitutional right to participate in
this project, and (2) Congress has improperly delegated legislative
authority to the executive department. Basing his decision only on
the first point in the argument of the appellee, Judge Moorman, writ-
ing for the majority, affirmed the judgment beiow.15
It would appear that the issue is thus resolved upon the ques-
tions whether "first, is the national government empowered to ex-
pend the national revenues for such a purpose, the expenditure being
- 78 F. (2d) 684 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). The opinion added nothing to what
had already been written by the lower court. But Judge Florence Allen wrote
a vigorous dissent in which she held the condemnation prayed for to be consti-
tutionally authorized. She reasoned that there was no invalid delegation to the
executive of legislative power. "The case in my judgment does not fall within
the doctrine of Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241(1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup.
Ct. 837 (1935). * ** The sections of the Act here involved provide for no code
nor penalty, but relate to a purely executive function, namely, the preparation
and carrying out of a comprehensive program of public works ** *". If Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, mspra, and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
supra, are controlling, the standards therein held to be necessary exist in these
sections of the statute. The terms used are defined in the dictionary, and are
understood in common speech. Slum clearance involves the wrecking of houses
in a slum and the clearing of slum lands for new and sanitary dwellings. 'Low-
cost housing' is not ambiguous. Such projects have been carried on in civilized
countries, including the United States, for many years." Id. at 688.
Judge Allen held, further, that "The questions are whether under the
Constitution (1) the Congress is authorized to levy a tax and make appropria-
tions for a comprehensive program of low-cost housing and slum-clearance, and(2) whether the United States Government can exercise the right of eminent
domain in order to carry out such program." Ibid. Answering both questions
in the affirmative, she held that the general welfare clause conferred upon
Congress an independent and substantive power, stating, "It is only to the
authority granted by this clause that much of the constructive legislation
enacted by the Congress during the past one hundred years is referable. The
Constitution made no provision for the Bureau of Education, the Department
of Labor, the Department of Commerce, the Public Health Service, the Geo-
logical Survey, the Bureau of Mines, the Department of Agriculture, the
Bureau of Fisheries, the Children's Bureau, the Smithsonian Institution, the
Bureau of Standards. * * * The power of eminent domain may be exercised
wherever necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power of taxa-
tion and appropriation for the general welfare. * * * national low-cost housing
and slum-clearance projects involve a public use" for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised. Ibid. et seq.
Judge Allen concluded that "The power of condemnation by the state is
to be considered in the light of the police power. The power of condemnation
by the National Government is to be considered in the light of the express and
independent power of the Congress to levy and collect taxes and make appro-
priations to provide for the general welfare. In the exercise of this specific
power, the National Government may undertake those projects which benefit
the health, the morals, and the general welfare of the people. One such project
is the elimination on a comprehensive scale of the slum." Id. at 691.
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part and parcel of a much broader program for relieving a nation-
wide condition of unemployment; secondly, is it entitled to exercise
the power of eminent domain in furtherance of such a program?" 16
Since the adoption of the Constitution, there has been a conflict
of opinion, over the scope of the taxing and spending power granted
to Congress. The opposing schools of thought have followed Hamil-
ton or Madison as they construed "general welfare" to mean an in-
dependent grant of taxing and spending power or merely a descrip-
tive limitation upon the specific powers granted. 17 Although the
issue has been the subject of discussion in a line of cases from
McCulloch v. Maryland'8 to Massachusetts v. Mellon,'9 no decision
of the Supreme Court can be said to decide the question squarely,
unless it is the Hoosac Mills case,20 where, although the processing
taxes created by the Agricultural Adjustment Act were held to be
unconstitutional, as violative of the Tenth Amendment,2 1 yet both the
majority and the minority of the court accepted the Hamiltonian
interpretation of the general welfare clause. It may be observed, at
this point, that the latent conflict between the general welfare clause
and the Tenth Amendment has been revealed in this case. However,
the case of United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry.2 2 seems to have
the most direct bearing upon the present problem. There, the power
of Congress to appropriate money and condemn land for the creation
of a national park from the battleground was sustained. The opinion
invoked the "necessary and proper" clause in relation to the power
"to declare war and to create and equip armies and navies," and "the
great power of taxation to be exercised for the common defence and
" Corwin, Constitutional Aspects of Federal Housing (1935) 84 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 131.
"'Legis. (1935) 24 GEo. L. J. 130. No attempt is made here to digest the
copious material on the subject. A discussion of it will be found in the
article by Professor Corwin, supra note 16. See also CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT
OF THE SUPREM E CoURT (1934) c. IV.
184 U. S. 316 (1819).
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923). This action was brought by the
state of Massachusetts on behalf of itself and its citizens, and by a taxpayer,
against the United States on the theory that the United States had no power
to appropriate and grant money conditionally to the states for maternity aid,
the assertion being made that the appropriations were local and not national,
and induced the states to yield certain of their sovereign rights. The Court
held that neither the taxpayer nor the state, could object to such expenditures
because neither one was sufficiently a party in interest to give jurisdiction over
the subject, for no new tax had been levied to maintain such expenditures. The
Court stated that the merits of the constitutional question were not considered.
'
8United States v. Butler, et al., - U. S. -, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
-aU. S. CNST. Amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."
2 160 U. S. 668, 16 Sup. Ct. 427 (1896).
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general welfare," 23 but the latter point appears to have furnished
the real basis for the decision.
2 4
The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and
may be exercised as an aid in carrying into execution the enumerated
powers by means of the "necessary and proper" clause.25 It is not
open to serious question that the power may be exercised only for a
public use. The term "public use" has been subjected to many in-
terpretations, ranging from the conservative one expressed in the
opinion in the Louisville case 26 to the liberal one adopted by the
Supreme Court in Green v. Frzier,2T where it was held that the
states have power to carry on low-cost housing and slum-clearance
projects within their own borders, and the court implied that "public
use" might be considered to mean "public purpose" or "public ad-
vantage." 28 Between these two extremes it has been variously held
"Id. at 681.
2' "No narrow views of the character of this proposed use should be taken.
Its national character and importance, we think, are plain. The power to
condemn for this purpose need not be plainly and unmistakably deduced from
any one of the particularly specified powers. Any number of those powers
may be grouped together, and an inference from them all may be drawn that
the power claimed has been conferred." Id. at 683.
U. S. CONsT. Art I, § 8, cl. 18.
"The right of eminent domain was one of those means well known when
the Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public uses.
Its existence, therefore, in the grantee of that power, ought not to be ques-
tioned. The Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it beyond
what may justly be implied from the express grants. The Fifth Amendment
contains a provision that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. What is that but an implied assertion, that, on
making just compensation, it may be taken?" Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
367, 372, 23 L. ed. 449 (1875). Here, land was appropriated for a post-office,
custom-house, and federal court.
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are constitutional." McCulloch v. Maryland, sapra note 18, at 421.
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1892);
Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. 397 (1896).
"Supra note 8. The court based its interpretation on the authority of
Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W. 762 (1907);
Fitzpatrick v. Warden, 157 Ky. 95, 162 S. W. 550 (1914); Arnsperger v.
Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 61 Atl. 413 (1905) ; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson
River R. R., 18 Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313 (N. Y. 1837) ; Healy Lumber Co.
v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681 (1903); LEwIs, EMINENT DoMAIN (3d
ed.) § 258.
'253 U. S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920).
'Id. at 238, 240. For a discussion of the various interpretations laid upon
the term "public use" by the Supreme Court, see J. W. and V. 3. Brabner-
Smith, The National Hotwing Program (1936) 30 ILL. L. Rav. 557. The
District Court in the Louisville case professes with concern to see the implica-
tions of state socialism in such an interpretation, supra note 8, but in doing so
appears to overlook the chief safeguard against such possible implications:
the legislation under discussion here is to subsist only during the present
emergency. Supra note 3.
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that the federal government has the right to take private property
for interstate canals, 29 bridges,30 and railroads,31 lighthouses, 32 for-
tifications and military bases, 33 flood control and irrigation projects, 34
and national parks.35 In granting the dismissal of the Louisville
case,30 at the request of the government, the Supreme Court has post-
poned the determination of whether the project there involved is a
public use.
In view of the fact that there are numerous projects still under
way similar in nature to the Louisville project, it is likely that the
questions presented in the Louisville case will come before the Su-
preme Court at some future time. Then, it may be argued that
these projects violate the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution,
which reserves to the states the power to promote the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. If so, it will be the task of the
Court to determine whether that reservation is a restriction on the
powers of Congress, notwithstanding the long course of legislation by
Congress; 3 7 the "occasional excursions" of the Supreme Court; 38
and the complete inability of the states to deal effectively with the
nation-wide condition of unemployment and sub-standard housing
conditions.
There is a possibility that the court may decide cases involving
these projects arising in the future upon still another ground, namely,
the suggested unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legis-
lative power to the executive department. In that event, the court
may consider the contention of the majority of the Circuit Court
in the Louisville case that "there is nothing in the Act * * * to serve
as a guide to the President in exercising the powers conferred upon
him," 39 as against the argument of the minority that a reasonable
standard has been laid down. 40
"'Hanson v. United States, 261 U. S. 581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442 (1922).
' Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 14 Sup. Ct. 891 (1893).
' California v. Central Pacific R. R., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1888).
' Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. 397 (1895).
'Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U. S. 55, 46 Sup. Ct. 39(1925); see United States v. First Nat. Bank, 250 Fed. 299, 302 (N. D. Ala.
1918).
, Brown v. United States, 263 U. S. 78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92 (1923).
' Shoemaker~v. United States, 147 U. S. 282, 13 Sup. Ct. 361 (1892).
' See N. Y. Times, March 6, 1936, at 4.
Alluded to by Judge Allen in her dissent, supra note 15.
' See, especially, Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281
(1912) (morals); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529
(1918) (interstate commerce) ; United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup.
Ct. 143 (1919) (interstate commerce).
' Supra note 15, at 685.
" Supra note 15.
For a discussion of the question of the delegation of legislative power
involved in the English housing problem, see Jennings, Courts and Adnzinistra-
tire Lav-The Experience of English Housing Legislation (1936) 49 HARV.
L. REv. 426.
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The State Aspect.
In the cases of (1) New York City Housing Authority V.
Muller, et al., 41 (2) In Matter of New York City Housing Author-
ity,42 and (3) Via v. Virginia State Commission on Conservation
and Development,43 the P. W. A. has been provided with an indirect
method 4 4 of obtaining land for its social program.
In the first and second cases, under the authority of the Munici-
pal Housing Authorities Law,45 the New York City Housing Au-
thority brought condemnation proceedings 46 in the New York Su-
preme Court against the owners of private property deemed by the
Authority 47 to be in slum areas. The owners urged the unconstitu-
S155 Misc. 681, 279 N. Y. Supp. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (McLaughlin, J.),
aff'd Court of Appeals, N. Y. Times, March 18, 1936, at 1 (Crouch, J.).
2 N. Y. Sup. Ct., June 3, 1935, N. Y. L. J., June 6, 1935, at 2909 (Lock-
wood, J.).
' 9 F. Supp. 556 (W. D. Va. 1935).
"By granting the necessary funds, as in the Muller case, supra note 41,
which, it would appear, no one is a sufficient party in interest to dispute, under
the rule of Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 19 (which rule would, of course,
extend to those cases where the owners of land would voluntarily sell their
property directly to the federal government, thus eliminating the necessity of
condemnation proceedings), to the state governments for them to apply to the
furtherance of the national program; or by accepting the conveyance of lands
condemned by the individual states, as in the Via case, sutpra note 43.
But in reference to the rule of Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 19, it
has been convincingly stated that, "* * * Here courts have been able to dodge
the issue as to how far Congress may go under the general welfare clause by
holding that, since damages could not be shown, it could not be claimed that
property was taken without due process of law. These precedents, although
favorable, are dangerous grounds on which to base a sanction for federal action
in housing; it seems self-evident that the taking of property, as well as federal
competition with existing housing properties, may be claimed to constitute
damages, and such action, therefore, will require a specific warrant under the
Constitution." Holden, Housing at the Crossroads (Feb. 1936) 25 SURVEY
GRAPHIc 2.
11 N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 4. "It is hereby declared that in certain areas of
cities of the state there exist unsanitary or sub-standard housing conditions
owing to over-crowding and concentration of population, improper planning,
excessive land coverage, lack of proper light, air, and space, unsanitary design
and arrangement, or lack of proper sanitary facilities; that there is not an
adequate supply of decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations for
persons of low income; that these conditions cause an increase and spread of
disease and crime and constitute a mnhace to the health, safety, morals, welfare,
and comfort of the citizens of the state, and impair economic values; that these
conditions cannot be remedied by the ordinary operation of private enterprise;
that the clearance, replanning, and reconstruction of the areas in which
unsanitary or sub-standard housing conditions exist and the providing of decent,
safe, and sanitary dwelling accommodations in said areas and elsewhere for
persons of low income are public uses and purposes for which public money
may be spent and private property acquired; and the necessity in the public
interest for the provisions hereinafter enacted is hereby declared as a matter
of legislative determination." § 61. -
"The taking of necessary land by eminent domain is provided for in § 70.
" For a report of the findings of the New York City Housing Authority,
see its publication, FIRST HoUSES (1935).
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tionality of the housing law on the grounds that it (1) allows a tak-
ing of private property for a private use, and (2) is. legislation for
a particular class of persons. However, the courts in both instances
sustained the right to condemn, holding that a use designed for the
entire public, even though available to only a part of the public, is
a public use, 48 and that the legislative determination that such con-
demnation would help to abolish disease- and crime-breeding slums
for the benefit of all the people of the state was constitutionally
authorized. 49
In opposition to these decisions, it may be pointed out that legis-
lation for "persons of low income," as provided in Section 61,1o is
legislation for a class and for a private purpose; that the tax ex-
emptions provided in Section 74 51 will cause the loss of part of the
taxable area of the city,52 thereby resulting in a proportionately in-
creased burden of taxation for private landowners; and that there
will be a consequent decrease in the value of privately owned land
in the vicinity of the projects. 53
In the third case, the right of a state to take private property
by eminent domain for the purpose of conveying the property thus
acquired to the federal government to establish a national park was
" Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co., 240 U. S. 30, 32, 36 Sup. Ct. 234 (1916) (public utility may take land for
the purpose of supplying electricity to the public) ; Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S.
361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676 (1904) (property appropriated for an irrigation ditch) ;
Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527, 26 Sup. Ct. 301 (1905)
(mining corporation may take land for the purpose of bringing materials
necessary to mining operations) ; Hairston v. Danville & Western R. R., 208
U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331 (1908) (railroad may appr priate land for right of
way to reach a private industry) ; O'Neall v. Leamer, 239 U. S. 244, 36 Sup.
Ct. 54 (1915) (property may be taken for a drainage system).
"Cf. Hermitage Co. v. Goldfogle, 236 N. Y. 554, 142 N. E. 281 (1923),
and Mars Realty Corp.'v. Sexton, 141 Misc. 622, 253 N. Y. Supp. 15 (Sup.
Ct. 1931), where a statute providing for the exemption from taxation of
limited-dividend corporations, which own houses for the same low-income
groups sought to be aided under the Municipal Housing Authorities Law, supra
note 46, was held to be constitutional.
r, Supra note 46.
'§ 74 provides: "An authority shall be exempt from the payment of any
taxes or fees to the state or any subdivision thereof or to any officer or
employee of the state or subdivision thereof. Bonds and mortgages of an
authority are declared to be issued for a public purpose and to be public
instrumentalities, and together with interest thereon, shall be exempt from tax.
The property of an authority shall be exempt from all local and municipal
taxes. An authority shall pay to the city a sum fixed annually by the city.
Such sum shall not exceed in any year the sum last levied as an annual tax
upon the property of the authority prior to the time of its acquisition by the
authority."
'There are seventeen square miles of land involved in the three city
projects: First Houses (Manhattan-lower east side), Ten Eyck Houses
(Brooklyn-Williamsburg), and River Houses (Manhattan-Harlem). Supra
note 47, at 15.
'The Astor properties, comprising the major portion of the First Houses
project, were assessed at a total valuation of $422,700, but they were sold to
the Authority for only $189,281. Id. at 20, 21.
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contested. By an act of Congress it had been directed that when
title to certain lands in the Blue Ridge Mountains should be vested
in the United States in fee simple, they should be dedicated and set
apart as a public park, to be known as the Shenandoah National
Park, with the provision that no such lands should be purchased by
the federal government, but should be procured by it only by public
or private donation, and it authorized the Secretary of Interior to
accept title to the lands.54 The Virginia General Assembly then
enacted the National Park Act in which a state commission was em-
powered to acquire title by condemnation of lands deemed by it to
be suitable for public park purposes and to convey them to the
United States. 55 Thereafter, the commission acquired by condemna-
tion proceedings various parcels of land, one of which was owned
by the plaintiff, for the purpose of conveying them to the federal
government. Subsequently, the plaintiff instituted this suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to
remove the cloud upon his title placed there by the condemnation
proceedings, alleging that he was deprived of his property without
due process of law and that the National Park Act " was uncon-
stitutional. Jurisdiction was invoked on the ground of diversity of
citizenship.
The plaintiff contended, in substance, that what the federal gov-
ernment could not do by direction, it could not equitably do by in-
direction.57 On the ground that the public had complete enjoyment
of the appropriated land, the court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to equitable relief and that the Act was constitutional."8
' 44 STAT. 616 etseq. (1926), 16 U. S. C. A. §403 et seq. (1927).
'Va. Acts 1928, c. 371, §§ 3, 6, 7.
Ibid.
In the absence of federal decisions directly in point, the plaintiff relied
on People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 9 Am. Rep. 94
(1871). The court held here that it was beyond the power of the state of
Michigan to condemn lands for the purpose of conveying them to the United
States for the latter to erect a lighthouse thereon. The plaintiff also relied on
Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 22 Am Rep. 76 (1876). In this case,
the court held that the right of the state to condemn land for the erection of
a federal courthouse must be denied because such taking was not for a public
use. See Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U. S. 700, 707, 708, 43 Sup.
Ct. 689 (1923).
On the authority of Rudacille v. Virginia State Commission on Conserva-
tion and Development, 155 Va. 808, 156 S. E. 827 (1931). Here, the court
held that the condemnation of land by the defendant for the purpose of convey-
ing it to the United States for a national park was a public use because the
citizens of Virginia will receive the major benefit from the establishment of
the park.
The cases cited by the plaintiff were distinguished on the ground that they
concerned situations where the public had no right to use the appropriated
lands. See Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1143.
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Conclusion.
The conclusion reached from a study and comparison of these
cases arising out of federal and state condemnation 59 is that the fun-
damental distinction between the right of eminent domain of a state
and that of the federal government lies in the structure of the powers
of the two sovereignties.60 The power of eminent domain may be
exercised by the state within its borders only in furtherance of a
public use, whereas the power may be exercised by the federal gov-
ernment within state borders to effect such purposes as are public
and are, at the same time, within the scope of the powers delegated
by the states in the Constitution. It seems abundantly clear that the
federal program under consideration here involves a public use, and
that a liberal application of the general welfare clause would result
in the vesting of a power in the federal government to materialize
its program. The fundamental principles of the Constitution must
be subserved, but because the Constitution is not a fixed definition
of static rights, as of the day of its adoption, but was designed
rather as a document capable of reflecting future economic and social
changes, 61 these principles must be taken into consideration in the
argument of slum-clearance and low-cost housing legislation . 2  It
appears that the Hoosac Mills case 63 takes full cognizance of this
basic thought.
The federal aspect of this problem may soon assume different
proportions, inasmuch as Senator Robert F. Wagner has declared
his intention to introduce into Congress, during the present session,
a bill which will supersede Title II of the N. I. R. A., now being
contested in the cases herein discussed. 64 It seems that the day is
soon to come, when the solution of our slum-clearance and low-cost
housing problem will be realized. 65 The public has become concerned,
' United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, et at., supra note 7;
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, et al., supra note 41; In Matter
of New York City Housing Authority, supra, note 42; Via v. Virginia State
Commission on Conservation and Development, supra note 43.
' Note (1935) 4 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 130.
' 1 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 43; THE FEDERALIST, No. XXXI (1788) 182; CORWIN, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 180 et seq.
'Note (1935) 9 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 362.
' Supra note 20, at 319. The Court followed the liberal interpretation of
the general welfare clause, which is adopted in 1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (5th ed.) § 907. Id. at 318.
, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1935, at 24.
'The need for such legislation is indicated in Roosevelt's Biggest Failure
(Feb. 19, 1936) 86 THE NEW REPUBLIC 1107. However, the American Fed-
eration of Labor Housing Committee opposes any coordinated housing program
which would combine the activities of the present F. H. A. with the slum-
clearance and low-cost housing projects, chiefly on the ground that the F. H. A.
has not benefited low-income families. N. Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1936, at 4.
An annual rent subsidy, as a substitute for outright federal grants, has been
proposed by Harold Riegelman. This proposal, he contends, would both
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and the courts and legislatures are striving diligently to round out
the proper legal procedure.
BENNETT D. BROWN.
THE LIFE INsURANcE TRUST.
Although the insurance trust was employed in America as long
ago as 18691 and was actively advocated during the ensuing years,2
it has assumed real importance during the last decade and a half.3
Statistics indicate that'at the close of 1930 over four billion dollars
of insurance trusts were in existence.4 These trusts have been classi-
fied in two outstanding groups, known as the unfunded and funded
trusts.
stimulate private enterprise in housing and provide the low-income groups with
the necessary funds for paying their rent. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1936, at 8.
In his interesting article, supra note 44, Mr. Holden suggests another
solution to the troublesome problem of constitutional sanction. He proposes
that the President make recommendations for slum clearance and low-cost
housing through his various fact-finding agencies, which recommendations he
is authorized to make by virtue of the power "to give to the Congress informa-
tion of the state of the Union, and to recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," vested in him by Article
II, Section 3, of the Constitution. It has been held that he may appropriate
money to prepare such information. Then Congress, under its authority "to
coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," granted in Article
I, Section 8, clause 5, may put his recommendations into effect by appropriate
legislation. Thus, "through intelligent exercise of monetary control," Mr.
Holden concludes, "there is vested in Congress power adequate to accelerate
or retard the flow of credit for housing and for rebuilding and rehabilitation
of the undesirable sections of our cities."
'POWELL, TRUSTS AND ESTATES (1932) 48. The Girard Trust Co. of
Philadelphia was trustee.
'STEPHENSON, LIVING TRUSTS (1926) 19. The Provident Life & Trust
Co. of Philadelphia was its vigorous exponent.
'The late beginning of insurance is one of the reasons for the late rise of
insurance trusts. Although the first life insurance company in the, United
States, the Presbyterian Ministers' Fund of Philadelphia, was chartered in
1759, most existing companies in the United States were chartered within the
last fifty years. See STEPHENSON, Op. cit. supra note 2.
In fact, up to 1926, the sums placed in insurance trusts were negligible.
STEPHENSON, Op. cit. supra note 2. In the three ensuing years, insurance trusts
valued at over a billion dollars were created. 50 Trust Companies Magazine
363 (1930). See Address by F. H. Sisson, 1928, A Record Year for Trust
Service, published by Guaranty Trust Co., New York City.
'Estimate by Trust Division of The American Banker's Ass'n, no later
figures available; Note (1936) 45 HARV. L. REV. 896. The number of trusts
that actually take effect at insured's death is not known. Revocations have not
been considerable. One large trust company informed Professor Powell,
op. cit. supra note 1, that revocations of trusts created before 1928 were 3%o of
the total; in 1929, 4.3%; in 1930, 2.4%, and in 1931, 2.9%.
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